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Abstract
The economic analysis of trade-secret protection has traditionally focused
on the interests of companies to conceal information from competitors in order
to gain a competitive advantage through trade-secret law. This has neglected
cases in which the interest is not in concealing information from competi-
tors, but from trading partners. We investigate the social e¢ ciency e⁄ects
of trade-secret protection in such cases. Many results from economic theory
state that asymmetric information (and therefore also its legal protection)
is socially undesirable since it leads to ine¢ cient trade. At the same time,
protecting private information might create incentives for socially desirable
investments. We model this trade-o⁄ in a simple buyer-seller model and ￿nd
that, indeed, trade-secret protection has ambiguous welfare e⁄ects. However,
a simple, informationally undemanding rule, conditioning the applicability of
legal protection on a minimum investment by the informed party to conceal
the information, helps to apply trade-secret protection only when it increases
welfare. This rationalizes important features of current legal practice.
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11 Introduction
Con￿dentiality of information is often legally protected by trade-secret laws. A large
literature exists which analyzes trade-secret protection, and which typically de￿nes
a trade-secret as follows:
A trade secret is an item of information...that has commercial value
and that the ￿rm possessing the information wants to conceal from its
competitors in order to prevent them from duplicating it. (Friedman,
Landes, and Posner, 1991, 61)
Keeping such information secret seems warranted since ￿similar to patent pro-
tection ￿it creates incentives to invest in the generation of such valuable information
in the ￿rst place, see, e.g., Friedman, Landes, and Posner (1991), Kitch (1980) and
Bone (1998).
Although these aspects are very important, such analysis neglects that con￿-
dentiality is desired not only in "horizontal" relationships between competitors, but
also "vertically" between trading partners. For instance, a buyer usually does not
want the seller to know exactly her valuation of the product since this can worsen
her bargaining position. While it is obvious that concealing such information is
often valuable to the buyer, it is less clear whether such concealment is also socially
bene￿cial.
An example of such a vertical case recently arose in the German energy industry.
One of the key issues in the production of electric power is uninterrupted power
supply. Power plants usually commit at least a day ahead to deliver a certain
amount of electricity into the power grid. If the energy production at the power
plant breaks down, the plant operator has to buy energy on a short-term basis in
order to ful￿ll his commitment. While, in such a situation, the potential seller would
like to know how urgently the buyer needs additional power (as this in￿ uences the
price the seller would charge), the buyer is interested in keeping the breakdown of
her plant secret.
While power producers have traditionally been able to keep the production levels
of their power plants secret, in recent years several companies have interfered with
these attempts. In various countries, service companies provide real-time informa-
tion on the energy production of power plants to potential electricity sellers and
traders. These companies install measuring equipment under power supply lines
leading out of power plants. By measuring the electromagnetic ￿eld emitted by
the transmission lines, the equipment allows the service company to measure the
electricity supplied by the power plant into the grid.1 Electricity traders can buy
this information (almost) in real time. Since this reveals the power plant￿ s ability
1In the United States, e.g., Genscape, Inc., has been granted four patents on related measuring
technologies; see, e.g., Genscape, Inc. (2006) and Genscape, Inc. (2004). Similar patents exist for
measuring ￿ uid ￿ ows in gas and oil pipelines, see, e.g., Genscape, Inc. (2007).
2to sell electricity ￿or, in case of outages, their need to procure additional electric-
ity ￿power plant operators ￿led lawsuits against service companies that o⁄er this
information, arguing that the information is protected as a trade secret. As these
service companies do not only operate in Germany, but all over Europe and North
America, similar cases may arise in other jurisdictions.
This raises the question to what extent a buyer should be able to keep infor-
mation about her own valuation of a potential deal with a seller con￿dential, or
whether such information should always be divulged to the potential seller. Apply-
ing trade-secret law in such cases protects the asymmetry of information. From an
e¢ ciency point, this is irritating since it is well-understood that asymmetric informa-
tion can lead to ine¢ ciencies in buyer-seller relationships. Asymmetric information
creates information rents and thereby gives rise to the well-known trade-o⁄between
rents and e¢ ciency. The uninformed party might rather abstain from trading than
have to pay high information rents; thus, ine¢ cient trade results in the presence of
asymmetric information. Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) have shown that, un-
der rather general conditions, no mechanism exists which guarantees e¢ cient trade
under asymmetric information which is incentive compatible, individually rational
and exhibits a balanced budget.
However, information rents can also be socially bene￿cial if they result from
investments by the informed party. If, in the absence of secrecy, the informed
party were deprived of all rents, it would have no incentive to undertake e¢ cient
investments in the ￿rst place. This resembles the patent-like e¢ ciency argument in
"horizontal" trade-secret cases.
We investigate this trade-o⁄ between "e¢ cient trade" (adverse selection) and
"investment incentives" (moral hazard) in a simple model. A buyer and a seller
trade one unit of an indivisible good. The buyer has an outside option, but its
value is her private information. The seller makes a take-it-or-leave-it o⁄er to trade
the good. Before that, the buyer might undertake a non-veri￿able relation-speci￿c
investment, increasing her valuation of the good, but leaving the outside option
unaltered. We also allow for ex-ante investments in concealing and revealing the
information by the buyer and the seller, respectively. The size of the investments
determines the likelihood of the information to be revealed to the seller, who, in case
of revelation, can appropriate all gains from trade. Trade- secret protection implies
that ￿ex post ￿the seller is ￿ned in case he tries to ￿nd out the buyer￿ s information.
There are two main ￿ndings. First, having trade-secret protection is always
bene￿cial, i.e., there should always be a remedy for violation of trade secrets. The
reason is that the uninformed party (the seller) has a socially excessive interest to
invest in revelation of the information. With symmetric information, the seller is
able to appropriate all gains from trade, i.e., can use perfect price discrimination.
This leads to ex post e¢ cient trade. However, the seller￿ s incentive to make infor-
mation symmetric is not only motivated by the additional social surplus, but also
by appropriating the buyer￿ s information rent. Remedies for trade-secret violation
3work against this socially excessive rent seeking motive. Furthermore, asymmetric
information and its protection is socially bene￿cial since it protects the buyer￿ s infor-
mation rent which increases in the relation-speci￿c investment. Thus, returns on the
relation-speci￿c investment are protected and thereby trade-secret laws safeguard
investment incentives.
The second main ￿nding refers to a robust rule for the application of trade-
secret protection. The optimum size of the ￿ne depends on which of the underlying
e¢ ciency problems is dominant: the ￿ne should be large if the underinvestment
problem in the relation-speci￿c investment is large; the ￿ne should be small if the
danger of (ex post) ine¢ cient trade is dominant. A "conditional trade-secret pro-
tection rule" helps to apply trade-secret protection only when it is bene￿cial. This
rule is often found in trade-secret laws. It says that for trade-secret protection to
be applicable, the informed party must have undertaken some minimum e⁄ort to
conceal the information.
In buyer-seller relationships, such an e⁄ort will be small if the adverse selection
problem is large. In this case, there should be little trade-secret protection, and ￿
indeed ￿with the conditional trade-secret protection rule the expected ￿ne for the
uninformed seller will be small; i.e., he has a large incentive to reveal the buyer￿ s
type, which increases the likelihood of e¢ cient trade. To understand why this is
the case, consider a situation where most buyers have an attractive outside option.
Thus, many of them will anticipate that it is best for them to go for the outside
option. Since investments are relation-speci￿c, they will not invest at all. Thus,
they never have any information rent ￿and thus no incentive to engage in costly
concealing of information. This, in turn, reduces the expected ￿ne for the seller,
increases his incentive to invest in revelation, and thereby reduces the danger of
ine¢ cient trade.
For the opposite case, assume that the outside option is unattractive but the
relation-speci￿c investment is very e⁄ective. In such a case, the seller will set a price
which all types of buyers will accept. Thus, there is no adverse selection problem.
However, the moral hazard problem is severe, and therefore high expected ￿nes
are sensible. The conditional trade-secret protection rule works in this direction:
all types of buyers receive an information rent in case of asymmetric information,
therefore all of them invest in concealing. This increases the expected ￿ne and
discourages revealing e⁄orts ￿as it should from a social welfare perspective.
A key driver of our results, namely that private incentives for information reve-
lation can be excessive, goes back at least to Hirshleifer (1971), who introduced the
notion of "foreknowledge" which is valuable to its holder only due to its distributive
e⁄ect, not to its e¢ ciency e⁄ect. This constitutes already an important argument
contrary to the view that protection of secrecy of information generally tends to be
welfare decreasing, since more symmetric information should usually increase the
e¢ ciency of the allocation (see Posner (1981) and Stigler (1980), in particular for
the case of private information in employer-employee relationships). This discussion
4was taken up by Levin (2001) who ￿similar to our ￿ndings ￿￿nds ambiguous welfare
e⁄ects of information revelation in buyer-seller relations.
Finally, a paper closely related is Hermalin and Katz (2006). They are con-
cerned with the problem of "privacy" in particular of information of consumers or
employees. They think of the private information as being in principle veri￿able
in form of an "indicator variable" and ask who should have the "property rights"
on this indicator variable: the informed party or the uninformed party? They also
￿nd that the e⁄ects are ambiguous. The informed party need not be worse o⁄
when giving the property rights to the uninformed party, and welfare need not be
higher in this case. The major di⁄erence to our paper is that Hermalin and Katz
focus on a detailed analysis of the adverse selection problem, while we look also
at a moral hazard problem with respect to relation-speci￿c investments. Further-
more, we model trade-secret protection as a mechanism in￿ uencing the likelihood of
symmetric information, rather than comparing di⁄erent property rights regimes.
Our analysis is complementary to the existing literature on trade secrets men-
tioned in the beginning (Friedman, Landes, and Posner (1991), Kitch (1980) and
Bone (1998)), though clearly distinct since we focus on asymmetric information in
vertical trading relationships, while the existing literature is concerned primarily
with horizontal cases.
Furthermore, our paper is also related to the literature on disclosure duties in
contract law, such as Kronman (1978), Shavell (1994), or Grosskopf and Medina
(2008). This literature is concerned with investments which increase the probability
of e¢ cient trade, while in our model the investment increases the ex post surplus.
More technically, in our setting, the "type" of an agent is known to the agent, while
in the disclosure duties literature it is usually not; e.g., a contractor does not know
the cost of the project (i.e., his own type), but might ￿nd it out when undertaking
some information investment. In our model, the buyer always knows whether she
has a strong or weak position vis-a-vis the seller. The investment always increases
the value of the trade, given that trade occurs.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section two discusses the
legal framework we are considering. Sections three introduces the basic intuition
why trade-secret protection might be welfare reducing. Section four sets up the
model, which is analyzed in Section ￿ve. Section six discusses private damages
and conditional trade-secret protection as institutions to implement trade-secret
protection. Section seven brie￿ y discusses applications in and beyond trade-secret
laws, Section eight concludes.
2 Legal Framework
Information about the buyer￿ s valuation of a potential secret may, under certain
circumstances, be protected as a trade secret. While, in the United States, trade-
secret protection is a matter of state law, the general rules are very similar across
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Third Restatement on Unfair Competition2 and the Uniform Trade Secrets Act,3
which codify traditional common law rules and which most states used as a point
of reference when creating their trade-secret statutes.
In general, in order to qualify as a trade secret, information must confer an
economic advantage when kept secret, it must be secret in fact, and it must be
protected from disclosure by reasonable secrecy safeguards. Such safeguards may
include con￿dentiality agreements, constructing fences or walls to block public view,
using passwords, and restricting employee access to sensitive areas; see Uniform
Trade Secrets Act §1(4), Milgrim (2008), §1.01, and Bone (1998), 248-249. Trade-
secret protection is violated if the information is acquired, used or disclosed in breach
of con￿dence, by violating an independent legal norm (such as laws against trespass,
fraud or theft) or by other improper means.4
Under the German Act Against Unfair Competition, in order to qualify as a
trade-secret, information must be related to a ￿rm, it must be known only to a
limited number of people, the ￿rm must have a legitimate interest in the secrecy, and
it must be obvious that the ￿rm wants to keep the information secret, see Hefermehl,
K￿hler, and Bornkamm (2008), §17 UWG Rdnr. 4. Trade-secret protection is
violated if the information is acquired, used or disclosed without authorization by
technical means or by creating or taking away a ￿xed copy of the information; see
Section 17 of the German Act Against Unfair Competition.
While the details of trade-secret protection di⁄er across jurisdictions, the general
requirements and limitations are very similar. In many jurisdictions, information
can only be protected as a trade secret if the owner of the secret takes reasonable
precautions to prevent disclosure.5 Without such precautions, there is no indication
that the owner has a real interest in keeping the information secret. However, the
law does not require such precautions to be perfect. In particular, it does not require
the owner to guard against unanticipated, undetectable, or unpreventable methods
of espionage that are very costly or even impossible to prevent.6 Hence, a party
can seek trade-secret protection only if it has shown some e⁄ort to conceal the
information. At the same time, trade-secret protection puts a limit on the amount
of e⁄ort required for this.
2Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition §§ 39-45 (1995), superseding the Restatement
(First) of Torts §§ 757-759 (1939).
3Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 14 U.L.A. 433 (1985).
4What constitutes other "improper means" is subject to considerable debate; see only E.I.
duPont deNemours & Company, Inc., v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1016 (5th Cir. 1970).
5For U.S. trade-secret law, see Milgrim (2008), §1.03. For German trade-secret law, see Hefer-
mehl, K￿hler, and Bornkamm (2008), §17 UWG Rdnr. 10.
6E.I. duPont deNemours & Company, Inc., v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1016 (5th Cir. 1970).
63 Tradeo⁄s of Trade-Secret Protection
To formalize the tradeo⁄s of trade-secret protection as a means to protect the secrecy
of information, we discuss a simple buyer-seller relationship. Consider a buyer (she)
and a seller (he) who can trade one unit of an indivisible good. Production costs
for the seller are normalized to zero. The buyer￿ s valuation for the good is b > 0:
The buyer has an alternative sourcing option at cost c; b > c > 0: We assume that c
re￿ ects the actual production cost of the good in the outside option (e.g., c might be
the cost at which the buyer could produce the good herself). The value c is drawn
from a smooth distribution F with compact support on [c;c]; and its realization is
private information to the buyer. The seller has all bargaining power, i.e., he posts
a take-it-or-leave-it o⁄er by demanding a price p: The seller￿ s payo⁄ equals zero if
no trade happens, otherwise it equals p: For the buyer, the payo⁄when trading with
the seller is b ￿ p; and b ￿ c otherwise. Therefore, trade will only happen if p ￿ c:
The solution to this bilateral trading under asymmetric information is very sim-
ilar to a standard monopoly problem. The probability that trade at price p occurs
equals 1 ￿ F (p); thus we can interpret 1 ￿ F (p) as a demand function. Therefore,
the seller maximizes expected pro￿ts by maximizing:
￿S = p(1 ￿ F (p)) ! max
p : (1)
If ￿what we want to assume in the following ￿F (p) is log-concave and thereby
also 1 ￿ F (p) is log-concave, this problem has a unique solution (see Bagnoli and
Bergstrom (2005) and the references cited there), which we call pm: The seller sets
a monopoly price such that, for all realizations of c < pm; ine¢ cient trade occurs,
while for all higher values of c; c ￿ pm; e¢ cient trade takes place, and the buyer
receives an information rent. Figure 1 shows the similarity of the problem to the
standard monopoly problem, where the area A re￿ ects the deadweight loss from
monopoly, and the area B the information rent (or consumer surplus).
With symmetric information, the seller would be able to set the price identical to
c; implying e¢ cient trade and no information rent. This welfare improvement from
symmetric information is similar to the welfare improvement gained from perfect
price discrimination in the standard monopoly problem. Helping to create symmetric
information, e.g., by abolishing trade-secret protection, therefore has the potential
to increase e¢ ciency.
However, this simple setup already suggests potentially bene￿cial e⁄ects of trade-
secret protection. If buyers and sellers could engage in e⁄orts to conceal or to reveal
the information, they would have a strict incentive to do so. The buyer would invest
up to B to protect the information. In the current framework, this is clearly socially
wasteful. However, also the seller￿ s e⁄ort to reveal will be socially excessive. The
maximum the seller could gain from revealing the buyer￿ s type to him is not only
A; but A + B:
Trade-secret protection, or, more precisely, punishments for its violation, might
7Figure 1: Optimum pricing without relation-speci￿c investments
prevent the seller from engaging in (excessive) revealing e⁄ort. This, in turn, might
reduce the wasteful concealing e⁄ort by the buyer. Therefore, trade-secret protection
might be bene￿cial by reducing wasteful rent seeking activities.
Another argument in favor of trade-secret protection refers to the information
rent B : Assume the buyer could engage in activities that increase her valuation for
the good. If this increases her information rent, she will have an incentive to engage
in such investment. However, if, with symmetric information, the buyer would be
able to appropriate all consumer surplus, symmetric information removes investment
incentives. To make these arguments more precise, we need a more complete model.
4 Model
We maintain the basic assumptions of the last section, but add explicitly rent seeking
activities of the parties, as well as investment of the buyer in the valuation of the
good. Finally, we specify how trade-secret protection works in this context.
In t = 0; the buyer￿ s type is determined. The realization of c is private informa-
tion. In t = 1, the buyer and the seller can simultaneously engage in concealing and
revealing e⁄ort. Call the concealing e⁄ort of the buyer ￿B; and the seller￿ s revealing
e⁄ort ￿S: The cost of these investments to the subjects are given by ￿(￿i); i = B;S;
where ￿
0 (0) = 0, ￿
0 > 0 for ￿i > 0; and ￿
00 > 0: Investment levels cannot be observed
by the other party.
In t = 2; the buyer can make a relation-speci￿c investment e to increase the value
from trading with the seller. Thus, the valuation is now b(e); with b0 > 0; b00 < 0:
The bene￿t from choosing the outside option is not a⁄ected by this investment:
8Figure 2: E⁄ect of concealing and revealing e⁄ort
it always equals b(0) ￿ c: The investment e is non-observable and non-veri￿able.
Therefore, with symmetric information, the hold-up problem would arise, since the
seller would demand the total ex post surplus equal to b(e)￿[b(0) ￿ c]; anticipating
this, the buyer would not invest at all, e = 0:
After the choice of the investment, nature determines in t = 3 whether the private
information of the buyer, i.e., her type c and her investment level e; is revealed to
the seller or not. Revelation happens with probability ￿; where ￿ is a function of
the di⁄erence between the revealing and concealing e⁄orts: ￿ = ￿(￿S ￿ ￿B); with
￿0 > 0: If the seller has invested a lot to reveal, while the buyer has invested little
to conceal, the probability of revelation will be large.
To facilitate the analysis, we want to restrict attention to outcomes with the
following properties: (i) ￿00 = 0 in the relevant parameter region, and (ii) in equilib-
rium ￿ 2 ]0;1[. A su¢ cient condition for the two properties to apply in equilibrium
would be that ￿00 = 0 at all ￿ 2 ]0;1[ and that ￿(￿i) is su¢ ciently convex. More
generally, we think of a function ￿(￿S ￿ ￿B) taking the form depicted in Figure 2,
where, due to ￿ being su¢ ciently convex, we can restrict attention to the parameter
region T:7
Note that we consider only cases where ￿ > 0; which implies that the private in-
formation could always be revealed to the seller even if the seller had not undertaken
any e⁄ort to reveal it. In many applications, it seems plausible that the information
could become public just by chance (e.g., it could be published in a newspaper).
In t = 4; the seller makes a take-it-or-leave-it o⁄er to the buyer. In t = 5, the
seller might be punished for the violation of trade-secret protection. With probabil-
ity ￿, the seller has to pay a ￿ne D if he tried to reveal the private information. The
harder he tried to ￿nd out, i.e., the higher ￿S; the higher the probability ￿; ￿ (￿S);
7In the Appendix, we discuss an extension of the model to incorporate alternative functional
forms of ￿(￿S ￿ ￿B) where we do not have to impose properties of the equilibrium outcome.
9Figure 3: Timing
with ￿
0 > 0: If he did not try to reveal, he will not be ￿ned, i.e., ￿ (0) = 0: We will
later discuss whether making the probability of a ￿ne to apply conditionally also on
￿B would make sense. Figure 3 summarizes the timing of the events.
That punishments are conditional on attempts to reveal the private information
is in line with currently used trade-secret law, as pointed out in section 2. The same
is true for assuming ￿ (0) = 0 : without a deed, there is no punishment.8 Note that
our assumptions imply that trade-secret protection can never prevent the seller from
using the information once it is revealed to him. This captures the idea that it is
impossible to credibly commit to forget something. However, trade-secret protection
can reduce the seller￿ s e⁄ort to reveal the information by the threat of punishment
in case of detection.
The ￿ne D reduces the seller￿ s payo⁄ but does not (directly) a⁄ect the buyer￿ s
payo⁄. This would be the case, e.g., for a prison sentence or a ￿ne payable to
the public budget (trade-secret laws allow for prison sentences).9 We will later
discuss the case of private damages (potentially including punitive damages), i.e., a
compensation payable by the seller that, at least some extent, increases the buyer￿ s
payo⁄.
The overall payo⁄s of the buyer and the seller are given by:
￿B =
￿
b(e) ￿ p ￿ e ￿ ￿(￿B) if trading with the seller,
b(0) ￿ c ￿ e ￿ ￿(￿B) if using the outside option.
￿S =
￿
p ￿ ￿(￿S) ￿ ￿D if trading with the buyer,
￿￿(￿S) ￿ ￿D if no trade occurs.
We look for a subgame perfect equilibrium of this game.
8An alternative assumption could be to condition the punishment on the actual use of the
information. We will later take up this point when discussing "private damages".
9See, e.g., § 499c of the California Penal Code and Section 17 of the German Act Against Unfair
Competition which allows for prison sentences of up to ￿ve years for severe trade-secret violations.
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5.1 Relation-Speci￿c Investment and Pricing
We solve the game backwards and start by analyzing stages t = 2 to t = 5: Assume
some equilibrium choice of the concealing and revealing e⁄orts ￿B and ￿S; deter-
mining a certain probability of revelation of the private information ￿: The ￿rst
proposition describes the optimal choices of the buyer￿ s relation-speci￿c investment
and the seller￿ s pricing behavior in t = 4:
Proposition 1 For the subgame starting at t = 2; there exists a unique subgame
perfect equilibrium. It is characterized as follows. The buyer chooses an ine¢ ciently
low investment level e￿; de￿ned by b0 (e￿) = 1
1￿￿ if she is of type c ￿ b c; where b c
is de￿ned by b(e￿)￿ pm = b(0) ￿ b c; for c < b c; the investment level is zero. The
seller posts a price pm = argmaxp(1 ￿ F [p ￿ (b(e￿) ￿ b(0))]) if information is
asymmetric; otherwise, the price equals b(e￿) ￿ [b(0) ￿ c] for c ￿ b c and c for c < b c.
Proof. Assume information was not revealed in t = 3: Then, the seller maximizes
￿S = p(1 ￿ F (p ￿ (b(e
￿) ￿ b(0)))):
Since in t = 4; ￿ and e￿ are already ￿xed, this reduces to maximizing with respect
to p, which has a unique solution pm if F (:) is log-concave, as assumed (see Bagnoli
and Bergstrom (2005) and the literature cited there). If the information is revealed,
perfect price discrimination occurs. Buyers anticipate pm; and ￿if they expect to
trade with the seller ￿maximize (1 ￿ ￿)[b(e) ￿ pm] ￿ e; implying e￿ being de￿ned
as in the Proposition, while e¢ cient investment requires b0 ￿
eFB￿
= 1. Only those
buyers for which the resulting payo⁄ b(e￿)￿ pm exceeds the outside option payo⁄
b(0) ￿ c; will choose positive investment levels. All lower c types will not invest at
all and choose the outside option, implying a cuto⁄ type b c:
If, in t = 3; the information on the type c and the e⁄ort choice e is revealed, the
seller will execute perfect price discrimination, i.e., he will demand a price equal to
the buyer￿ s ex post surplus in excess of her outside option payo⁄. This implies not
only that the buyer has no information rent, but also that she is expropriated of
all gains from her relation-speci￿c investment e; since e does not a⁄ect the outside
option.
If no revelation of information occurs, buyers get an information rent and can
increase this information rent by investing e: Therefore, asymmetric information
protects investment incentives. However, since information will be revealed with
probability ￿; this protection is imperfect and underinvestment occurs (the hold-up
problem is only partially solved). The investment incentives are decreasing in ￿.
However, not all types may get an information rent. Buyers can anticipate
the price pm the seller will demand. Buyers with a very attractive outside option
(a low c) anticipate that, with asymmetric information, they will still prefer the
11Figure 4: relation-speci￿c investment
outside option, even if they invested in increasing the valuation from inside trading.
These low c types therefore never receive a return on investing (not with asymmetric
information, and obviously not with symmetric information) and therefore abstain
from investing. An indi⁄erent type b c exists who anticipates that ￿ if investing
optimally (i.e., taking care of the fact that, with probability ￿, she will lose the
returns on the relation-speci￿c investment) ￿she will be indi⁄erent between trading
with the seller and the outside option. The seller, in turn, anticipates the optimal
investment decision and demands the monopoly price pm in case that information
is not revealed. Figure 4 depicts this situation.
Note that, in particular if investments are very e⁄ective, i.e., b(e￿) ￿ b(0) is
large, the seller might ￿nd it optimal to serve all types, i.e., b c = c and pm =
c + b(e￿) ￿ b(0): In this case, e¢ cient trade always occurs (the outside option
is never used); unfortunately, the hold-up problem is not solved: since ￿ > 0;
underinvestment still happens.
5.2 Concealing and Revealing Investments
In t = 1; the buyer and the seller simultaneously choose their concealing (￿B) and
revealing (￿S) e⁄ort, respectively. By doing so, they determine the probability of
symmetric information, ￿(￿B ￿ ￿S): The buyer wants to protect her information
rent and, for c ￿ b c, also the returns on the relation-speci￿c investment. The seller
wants to reveal the information in order to be able to execute perfect price dis-
crimination by appropriating the total ex post surplus of each type. However, the
seller is aware of the fact that, by increasing the "espionage" e⁄ort, he increases the
likelihood ￿ (￿S) of having to pay a ￿ne D at the end of the game.
12As noted before, types c < b c never receive any information rent and never un-
dertake relation-speci￿c investments. Hence, they have no interest in asymmetric
information, implying that they do not invest in concealing e⁄orts: ￿B = 0 for c < b c:
The remaining buyers of type c ￿ b c do have an incentive to conceal their type, since,
anticipating pm; they would be willing to trade with the seller and would get an in-




￿B = [1 ￿ ￿(￿S ￿ ￿B)](b(e) ￿ p
m) ￿ ￿(￿B) ￿ e
￿ (￿B;￿S); (2)
where e￿ is the solution to (1 ￿ ￿(￿S ￿ ￿B))b0 (e) = 1: Due to the envelope theorem,
the ￿rst-order conditions reduce to:
￿
0 (￿B) = ￿
0 (b(e
￿) ￿ p
m); for c ￿ b c: (3)
The seller￿ s expected payo⁄ equals:
￿S = [1 ￿ ￿(￿S ￿ ￿B)]p






b(e(c)) ￿ b(0) + cdF (c) ￿ ￿(￿S) ￿ ￿ (￿S)D; (4)
where the term in the ￿rst line refers to the pro￿t in case that the information is
not revealed, while the term in the second line refers to the pro￿t in case of type
revelation (minus the investment cost and the expected ￿ne). Note that, here, we
have (in slight abuse of notation) written the optimum relation-speci￿c investment
e as a function of the type to indicate that the optimum e⁄ort is positive if c ￿ b c;
and zero otherwise.
Alternatively, we can write the seller￿ s payo⁄ as:








m + ￿(￿S ￿ ￿B)[b(e
￿) ￿ b(0) + c ￿ p
m]dF (c)
￿￿(￿S) ￿ ￿ (￿S)D: (5)
The term in the ￿rst line is the expected gain from buyers with a good outside
option, the term in line two is the expected pro￿t from those with a bad outside
















The two ￿rst-order conditions (3) and (6) determine the best-response functions
in the "revelation-concealing" game. In this game, there exists a unique Nash equi-
librium, implying that the total game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium.
13Figure 5: Nash equilibrium for concealing (￿B) and revealing (￿S) e⁄orts
Proposition 2 There exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the game.
Proof. We know from Proposition 1 that the continuation game has a unique
subgame perfect equilibrium for given ￿B and ￿S: What is left to show is that ￿B
and ￿S are uniquely de￿ned by the best-response functions (3) and (6). Recall that
￿B and ￿S are chosen simultaneously and are not revealed to the other party. Thus,
in equilibrium each player will predict the equilibrium levels of ￿B and ￿S; implying
that changes in ￿B will not a⁄ect pm; and changes in ￿S will not a⁄ect e￿: By the
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00 + ￿00 (b(e) ￿ pm)
(7)
which is zero by our assumption that ￿00 = 0 in the relevant parameter region. Again,
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which also equals zero for the same reason. Thus, the best-response functions in-
tersect exactly once. Figure 5 depicts the two best-response functions derived from
the ￿rst-order conditions.
Due to our assumption that ￿00 = 0 (at least for the relevant parameter region),
the best responses are independent of the e⁄ort choice of the other party, since the
14marginal productivity of concealing and revealing does not depend on the choice
of the other party. Since ￿S and ￿B will always be positive (we assumed that the
￿rst (marginal) unit is costless, ￿
0 (0) = 0), the best-response functions both equal
positive constants.
5.3 Optimal Expected Fine
We now want to investigate variations in the expected ￿ne, ￿D. We want to assume
that they are triggered by variations in D; variations in ￿ (increasing the likelihood
of punishment for given levels of espionage e⁄ort ￿S) would have similar e⁄ects.
An increase in the ￿ne D obviously reduces the incentive to invest in revealing
e⁄ort, since the probability ￿ of a ￿ne increases in ￿S (see (4)). Since the ￿ne D
does not directly a⁄ect the buyer￿ s payo⁄ (only indirectly via the seller￿ s reaction
to variations in ￿S); an increase in D shifts only the reaction function of the seller
to the left, implying that ￿S decreases and therefore the probability ￿ of symmetric
information decreases as well. Compared to a situation without a ￿ne, i.e., compared
to D = 0; introducing a (potentially small) ￿ne is welfare-increasing; as stated in
the next Proposition.
Proposition 3 The socially optimal ￿ne D is positive, D￿ > 0:
Proof. The expected social surplus equals:














implying a strictly lower ￿S than chosen by the seller for D = 0; as it can be seen
from (6): Thus, reducing the private incentive by increasing D (as can again be seen
from (6)) above zero increases the social surplus.
The seller￿ s incentive to reveal the asymmetric information is excessive from a so-
cial welfare perspective, as can be seen directly from (6). There, the ￿rst term in the
square brackets re￿ ects the social gain from increasing the likelihood of symmetric
information (it corresponds to the area A in Figure 1), and the second term in the
square brackets re￿ ects the redistribution gain for the seller (it corresponds to the
area B in Figure 1). Introducing a positive ￿ne for trying to reveal the information
works against this excessive private (rent seeking) incentive to invest in revelation.
What in￿ uence the optimal size of the ￿ne? There are two opposing welfare ef-
fects. First, increasing the ￿ne helps to reduce the hold-up problem. It reduces the
probability ￿ of symmetric information and thereby increases the expected returns
15on the buyer￿ s relation-speci￿c investment. Second, because it increases the proba-
bility of asymmetric information, it increases the likelihood of ine¢ cient trade, since
￿if the information is not revealed ￿with probability F (b c) the ine¢ cient outside
option is realized. Note that an increase in D does not only increase (1 ￿ ￿); but
also decreases b c: A higher value of (1 ￿ ￿) increases e￿; and thereby increases b(e￿):
We know that b c = pm ￿ [b(e￿) ￿ b(0)]: An increase in b(e￿) also increases pm; but
to a smaller extent than b(e￿) is increased, implying that b c decreases.
More formally, the opposing e⁄ects can be seen when taking the ￿rst derivative
of the total surplus given in (9) with respect to D :
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The ￿rst four terms are positive (note that for ￿ > 0; the buyer￿ s optimization
problem with respect to e always yields @b=@e > 1), while the last one is nega-
tive. The ￿rst term re￿ ects the social gain from reducing the moral hazard problem:
buyers are willing to choose higher relation-speci￿c investment levels, when the prob-
ability of symmetric information decreases due to an increase of the ￿ne. The second
term re￿ ects the decrease in the cuto⁄ type b c : more types are willing to choose a
positive investment level if the danger of symmetric information decreases. Term
three describes the saved revealing e⁄ort costs, term four accounts for the fact that
the marginal buyer who is now willing to trade with the seller no longer wastes c in
case of asymmetric information by taking the outside option. Term ￿ve re￿ ects that
an increase in the ￿ne D reduces the probability of symmetric information, which
leads all buyer types who will not trade with the seller under asymmetric informa-
tion to use the ine¢ cient outside option under asymmetric information. From (11)
we can immediately derive the following Proposition:
Proposition 4 The optimum ￿ne D￿ is small if the relation-speci￿c investment is
ine⁄ective, i.e., for b0 ! 0: D￿ goes to in￿nity for b c = c:
If b c = c; no adverse selection problem exists any longer, i.e., the only negative
term in (11) vanishes. This is intuitive: if b c = c; all types will trade with the seller at
a given level of ￿; reducing ￿ will therefore only have the bene￿cial e⁄ect of curing
the hold-up problem. Therefore, the ￿ne should be prohibitively high in case that
no adverse selection problem exists.10
b c = c will occur either if c is large. Just like a monopolist who faces only
customers with a high willingness to pay, such that the marginal revenues on the
last customer still exceed the marginal cost, the seller will set a price such that all
10Recall that, if b(e) increases, also pm increases, but to a smaller extent. Therefore, if all types
traded with the buyer initially, they will still trade after the increase in b(e):
16types get served. The same e⁄ect can be obtained if c is small but the relation-
speci￿c investment is very e⁄ective, i.e., b0 is large. Then, even the lowest type will
￿nd it worthwhile to invest e￿; implying a large value of b(e￿) and a large marginal
revenue on the lowest type such that again all types get served.
However, if we reduce the e¢ ciency of the relation-speci￿c investment, it will
no longer be the case that all types will invest, and that nobody wants to use the
outside option. Taken to the extreme, when the relation-speci￿c investment becomes
ine⁄ective, b0 ! 0; the ￿rst-order condition derived from (11) reduces to (10).11 All
reasons for a ￿ne (terms one, two, and four in (11)) have vanished, apart from the
motivation to reduce the excessive seller￿ s interest to engage in revelation. Thus, the
￿ne should still be positive, as we know already from Proposition 3, but it should
be small.
6 Implementation in Legal Institutions
The preceding section showed that the optimum ￿ne is positive and the size of the
￿ne should be large if the moral hazard dimension of the problem is large, compared
to the adverse selection problem. However, the detailed parameters of the problem
(such as the e⁄ectiveness of the relation-speci￿c investment, b0) are rarely observable
for courts. Even more importantly for practical applications, legal trade-secret pro-
tection should apply under well-de￿ned general conditions and its application should
not depend on details of the situation which are hard to verify. In this section, we are
looking for "robust" institutions in the sense that their application will lead to an
application of trade-secret protection only in the cases in which it is most bene￿cial.
We discuss two legal institutions, private damages and a "conditional trade-secret
protection rule", which capture important aspects of current legal practice.
6.1 Private Damages
So far we have assumed an exogenous remedy D which did not a⁄ect the buyer￿ s
payo⁄ directly. However, punishment for trade-secret violation frequently takes the
form of private damages,12 i.e., the level of the punishment is endogenous and it
directly increases the buyer￿ s payo⁄.
A key question is: What is the damage? In our model, the damage to the buyer
is her lost information rent. Let us assume that a court could ex post verify the size
of the lost information rent. For instance, it could compare the "usual" price (in
11Note that in this case e = 0: Therefore, the ￿rst term in (11) vanishes and b c is independent of
D:
12Along these lines, Section 3 of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act provides several ways to calculate
damages: punitive damages, as well as the calculation of the actual loss caused by misappropriation,
the additional unjust enrichment caused by misappropriation, or the calculation of a reasonable
royalty.
17case of no trade-secret violation) to the price charged in case of a violation. In this





￿) ￿ b(0) + c ￿ p
mdF (c): (12)
If information becomes symmetric and litigation happens, the seller has to pay
damages to the buyer. The size of this payment is equal to the information rent
which the buyer would have received, if the information had been kept secret.
There are two important observations. First, the size of punishment varies with
the information rent, which is bene￿cial in welfare terms. If the relation-speci￿c
investment is very e⁄ective (b0 is very large), then not only the gain from making
information symmetric increases, but also the punishment. Therefore, ￿S tends to
be small and therefore also ￿ will be small, implying high investment incentives for
the buyer, which is particularly bene￿cial if b0 is large. In the opposite extreme, if
the investment is not e⁄ective (b0 = 0), ￿automatically ￿the expected ￿ne is low
since the term b(e￿) ￿ b(0) vanishes.
The second observation is that (merely compensatory) damages imply too low
punishments. The reason is the same as pointed out in the proof of Proposition 3:
the seller has excessive incentives to invest in revealing due to rent seeking. With
private damages, these excessive rent seeking incentives stem from the case that the
rent need not be returned to the buyer (which happens with probability 1 ￿ ￿￿).
Therefore, private damages need to be "punitive damages".13
6.2 Conditional Trade-Secret Protection
Private (punitive) damages rely on the assumption that the size of the damage can
be veri￿ed by courts. In "horizontal" cases of trade-secret violation, this might be
relatively easy. Similar to a patent case, the court could try to calculate an equiva-
lent to foregone licensing royalties to estimate the damage. In our "vertical" cases,
calculating the information rent is much more di¢ cult. Furthermore, it is ques-
tionable if a court would accept an argument based just on a change in bargaining
power.
We now want to discuss an alternative approach which does not need to rely on
this ￿arguably unrealistic ￿assumption that private damages tailored to the size of
the lost information rent are possible. We return to the assumption of an ex-ante
￿xed ￿ne D:
In most legal systems, trade-secret protection can only be sought ￿and therefore
its violation can only be sued ￿if the informed party has undertaken some e⁄ort to
keep the information secret (see Section 2, footnote 5). In the terminology of the
13Note that in our context, punitive damages do not change the buyer￿ s incentive to invest in
concealing. They only increase the incentive to invest in the relation-speci￿c investment.
18model: trade-secret protection is conditional of ￿B to be positive, i.e.,
D
￿
> 0 if ￿B ￿ " > 0;
= 0 otherwise. (13)
We call this a "conditional trade-secret protection rule".
One concern with such a rule could be that it triggers ine¢ cient concealing
investments. This is, however, not true in our model. Such a rule does not increase
the buyer￿ s incentive to invest into concealing, which is determined by (3). In the
absence of any private claims against the seller, the buyer has no interest in an ex-
post punishment of the seller. Her incentives for concealing the private investment
stem only from the information rent which types with a weak outside option (c ￿ b c)
can gain from asymmetric information.
Therefore, the conditional trade-secret protection rule helps to apply trade-secret
protection in those cases in which it should be applied, and reduces its application
in the other cases. To see this, note that the seller cares about the expected ￿ne:
With a conditional trade-secret protection rule, the expected ￿ne is no longer ￿D;
since it applies only if the buyer has invested at least " into concealing. However,
only buyers with a type c ￿ b c do so. Conditional trade-secret protection now states
that, without any concealing e⁄ort, no violation of trade-secret protection will be
punished. Since the seller ￿when deciding on ￿S and on pm ￿does not know whether
the buyer he is facing is above or below b c; he calculates with an expected ￿ne of
￿DF (b c):
As discussed before, b c is small if the moral hazard problem is large: in the
extreme, with very e⁄ective relation-speci￿c investments, we will ￿nd b c = c: In this
case, the expected ￿ne is large and equals ￿D: From Proposition 4 we know that in
this case the optimum ￿ne should indeed be large.
In the opposite case, with a large adverse selection problem, i.e., a large value
of b c; the expected ￿ne is small, since F (b c) is small, as it should be, according
to Proposition 4. Therefore, the conditional trade-secret protection rule helps to
apply trade-secret protection only in those cases in which private information is
socially very valuable. It deters revelation e⁄orts less in those cases in which the
social bene￿t of private information is small. To the extent that the private parties
engaged in the interaction are better informed than a court about the details of their
interaction, such a rule seems bene￿cial. It helps an uninformed legislator or court
to apply trade-secret protection if and only if it tends to be socially bene￿cial.
7 Application In and Beyond Trade-Secret Law
Con￿ icts involving asymmetric information in buyer-seller relationships, as analyzed
in this paper, can be traced in trade-secret case law, both in Germany and in the
United States. The German electricity case, which was described in the introduction,
was settled before a district court in early 2006. It seems unlikely that a court
19would have found the service company installing the electromagnetic measuring
devices to violate German trade-secret law. This is in line with our model, which
shows that trade-secret protection should only be granted if the informed party
has made some e⁄ort to conceal its information, which was not the case in the
electricity example. In the United States, whether trade-secret protection applies
to information in buyer-seller relationships depends on the factual circumstances of
the case. Often, costs and input factors cannot be protected as trade secrets as they
are either well-known throughout the industry14 or because the informed party took
no measures to keep the information con￿dential.15 In general, whether information
about a buyer￿ s willingness to pay can be protected as a trade secret depends on
whether the information in question is easily available by other means and whether
the owner is able to and does in fact make attempts to keep the information secret.
It is worth noting that the basic idea that the legal protection of asymmetric
information about outside options has ambiguous welfare e⁄ects in some particular
buyer-seller relationships also applies to many other legal areas outside trade-secret
law. First, U.S. courts sometimes deny requests in buyer-seller relationships for
disclosing information collected by the government. Such decisions concern the
trade-secret exemption to the Freedom of Information Act,16 rulemaking procedures
of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,17 and securities regulation.18 Sec-
ond, while corporate law usually grants stockholders a broad right to inspect the
corporation￿ s books and records, the stockholder is not allowed to use his right to
do so in order to inform a customer of the corporation; nor is he allowed to use this
information in contract negotiations with the corporation.19 Third, such cases can
arise if a company engages in price discrimination and wants to prevent its various
customer groups from ￿nding out the di⁄erent prices o⁄ered.20
14See, e.g., Aetna Bldg. Maintenance Co. v. West, 39 Cal.2d 198, 206 (Cal. 1952); Rigging
Intern. Maint Co. v. Gwin, 128 Cal.App.3d 594, 611-612 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982); Simmons
Hardware Co. v. Waibel, 47 N.W. 814 (S.D. 1891).
15Carpetmaster of Latham, Ltd., v. Dupont Flooring Sys., Inc., 12 F.Supp.2d 257, 261-262
(N.D.N.Y. 1998).
16See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. NASA, 180 F.3d 303 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Gulf & Western
Industries, Inc., v. United States of America, 615 F.2d 527 (D.D.C. 1979) (denying requests under
5 U.S.C. §552 (b)(4)).
17Alabama Power Company v. Federal Power Commission, 511 F.2d 383, 391 note 13 (D.C. Cir.
1974) (upholding a rulemaking by the predecessor of today￿ s FERC which eliminates information
asymmetries). The rulemaking exists, in modi￿ed form, up to the present day, see 16 U.S.C. §824d,
§824e, 18 C.F.R. §141.61.
18American Sumatra T. Corp. v. Securities and Exch. Comm￿ n, 110 F.2d 117 (D.C. Cir. 1940)
(upholding a decision by the SEC which denied a request for con￿dential treatment of the plainti⁄￿ s
￿lings which could be the plainti⁄￿ s customers to calculate the plainti⁄￿ s pro￿t margin).
19See only §220(b) Delaware General Corporation Law. The same analysis applies to the right
of inspection under common law.
20See, e.g., the American Airlines, Inc. v. FareChase, Inc. controversy, which was ultimately
settled out of court. For more information, see http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/taxonomy/term/4,
and Southwest Airlines Co. v. FareChase, Inc., 318 F.Supp.2d 324 (D.S.C. 2004).
20This short survey demonstrates that the question whether information asymme-
tries about outside options should be legally protected in buyer-seller relationships
is not con￿ned to trade-secret law. While most decisions are very fact-dependant,
in general, courts seem somewhat reluctant to grant legal protection in such cases.
Generally, this is in line with the model presented in this paper. In many cases,
￿rms either do not need incentives in order to create the information they attempt
to protect, or they do not make any attempts to conceal this information. In such
cases, our model argues against legal protection. When, however, our model argues
for legal protection, the law is ￿ exible enough to grant such protection.
8 Conclusion
Information is valuable in vertical buyer-seller relations. We have analyzed whether
it should be protected by trade-secret laws. The answer is generally yes: Introduc-
ing a ￿ne for the violation of a trade secret is welfare-increasing. What is less clear
is the optimal size of the ￿ne. We found two ambiguous e⁄ects. Protecting the
information with high ￿nes is undesirable if the adverse-selection dimension of the
problem is important, i.e., if there is signi￿cant danger that ine¢ cient trade occurs.
If, however, the informed party can undertake relation-speci￿c investments to in-
crease the gains from trade, asymmetry of information and therefore trade-secret
protection is desirable as it protects the investment incentives.
Since in legal practice the relative size of the two e⁄ects is di¢ cult to measure, we
investigated private damages and conditional trade-secret protection as institutions
to implement trade-secret protection which are less informationally demanding, and
which are both part of the current legal practice. We ￿nd that both institutions
tend into the socially bene￿cial direction of limiting the application of trade-secret
protection to cases in which its bene￿ts are large. However, identifying the size of
private damages in vertical relationships is usually di¢ cult, and therefore conditional
trade-secret protection with a ￿xed ￿ne might be a superior solution.
Current legal practice combines both instruments. While our analysis points
out that this can be bene￿cial, it also highlights important drawbacks of such a
combination. Imagine that buyers can expect to receive punitive damages in excess
of their actually accrued damages. In this case, a combination of punitive damages
and conditional trade-secret protection is dangerous. It sets incentives for buyers
with a good outside option (who, in the absence of an expected damage payment,
would not invest in concealing), to start investing just in order to be eligible for
receiving damage payments. With punitive damages in particular, this can result
in signi￿cant welfare losses (due to wasteful concealing and due to the increasing
probability of ine¢ cient trade).
One "compromise" to solve this is to decouple the payment to the plainti⁄ from
the damages accrued by the defendant. If courts can vary the size of the punishment
depending on the ex-post observed size of actually accrued damages in terms of
21the lost information rent, only a fraction of this amount should be passed to the
plainti⁄. This provides additional arguments for "split awards" in addition to the
arguments in favor of such arrangements that result from the attempt to reduce
litigation costs.21 Combining this strand of literature with our view on trade-secret
protection opens interesting new research questions.
21See the original argument by Polinsky and Che (1991) in favor of decoupling payment to the
plainti⁄ from damages accrued by the defendant in order to save on litigation cost in case of a
￿xed probability of success in trial in case of litigation. Alternative results are derived for the case
in which the size of litigation costs a⁄ects the probability of trial success, see, e.g., Landeo and
Nikitin (2006) or Choi and Sanchirico (2004).
22Figure 6: Non-unique solution to the buyer￿ s ￿rst-order condition
9 Appendix: Alternative Assumptions on ￿(￿s ￿ ￿B)
In the main body of the text, we have assumed that the probability of symmetric
information ￿ is a linear function of the di⁄erence between the revealing and con-
cealing e⁄ort. This implied that the marginal productivity of investments in either
revealing or concealing is una⁄ected by the level of other parties￿e⁄ort. In the Ap-
pendix, we want to drop this assumption. In particular, we want to incorporate the
idea of a "decreasing marginal productivity" of such investment. We want to assume
that ￿ = ￿(￿S ￿ ￿B); with ￿0 > 0; and that ￿ is convex on [￿1;0] and concave on
[0;+1]: Thus, if one party has invested much more than the other, the marginal
productivity with the larger investment is small, while the marginal productivity of
the smaller investment is large. In the absence of strong asymmetries, this would
imply that, in equilibrium, ￿S and ￿B cannot be too di⁄erent.
In the following, we will show that, if the solution to the pro￿t maximization
game at stage 2 (the simultaneous choice of concealing and revealing e⁄ort) is
uniquely de￿ned by the ￿rst-order conditions, essentially all of our results of the
main body of the text hold. Furthermore, the analysis of the concealing/revealing
game becomes more interesting since changes in the ￿ne D will no longer only a⁄ect
the equilibrium level of ￿S; but also ￿B:
However, it is not ensured that the solution to the pro￿ts maximization problem
of both ￿rms is uniquely determined by the ￿rst-order conditions. Figure 6 illustrates
this for the ￿rst condition for the buyer, given by (3): Since we assumed ￿
0 (0) = 0,
there is at least one maximum, but there can be two local maxima.22
22An alternative assumption that ensures that the maximum is uniquely de￿ned by the ￿rst-
order condition would be that the marginal cost of revealing and concealing, ￿
0 (￿S) and ￿
0 (￿B),
are constant. Then we would have to focus on equilibria in which ￿S and ￿B are positive.
23Figure 7: Best-response functions for alternative assumptions on ￿
However, if the ￿rst-order condition has a unique equilibrium solution, we can
argue as follows; Propositions 1-3 still hold under this alternative setup. To see
this, note that ￿as in the main body of the text ￿for an expected level of e(c) and
an expected price pm in case that the information is not revealed, the slope of the
best-response functions in the game determining concealing and revealing e⁄orts are
still given by (7) and (8), respectively. However, we have dropped our assumption
that ￿00 = 0; therefore the slope of the best-response functions is no longer zero.
Since we assumed that ￿00 > 0 for ￿S ￿￿B < 0 and ￿00 < 0 for ￿S ￿￿B > 0; ￿B (￿S)
has a slope smaller than one, and the slope is positive for ￿B > ￿S; negative for
￿B < ￿S and goes to zero for ￿B ! ￿S: By the same reasoning, for ￿B < ￿S; the
slope of ￿S (￿B) is positive and smaller than one, for ￿B > ￿S; the slope is negative
and it goes to zero for ￿B ! ￿S: Therefore, the two best-response functions intersect
exactly once. Figure 7 illustrates this.
In this setup, an introduction of a ￿ne again reduces ￿S for each level of ￿B;
i.e., shifts the best response function of the seller to the left. For the same reason
given in the proof of Proposition 3, the optimum ￿ne is positive, due to the excessive
private interest of the seller to invest in revealing.
However, a shift in the best response function of the seller now also a⁄ects the
equilibrium concealing e⁄ort of the buyer. This has additional welfare e⁄ects, since
the concealing e⁄ort of the buyer is wasteful as such, and the private incentive to in-
vest in concealing exceeds the social bene￿t, since the private incentive includes rent
seeking (protection of the information rent concerning the type). A reduction of the
buyer￿ s concealing e⁄ort ￿B is therefore desirable from a social welfare perspective.
In "most" cases, an introduction of a ￿ne D > 0 will reduce at least the sum of
the concealing and revealing e⁄ort. This happens if ￿S ￿￿B is not too large. Figure
8 illustrates these cases.
24Figure 8: E⁄ect of increasing D if ￿S ￿ ￿B is not too large
In case 1, where initially ￿S < ￿B; the shift in the seller￿ s best response function
also leads to a reduction of ￿B; which is socially bene￿cial. In case 2, initially ￿S is
slightly larger than ￿B: In that case, the reduction in ￿S (￿B) triggers an increase
of the equilibrium value of ￿B. However, since for ￿B only slightly smaller than ￿S;
the slope of the best response function ￿B (￿S) is smaller than one, therefore, ￿B is
reduced less than ￿S; and the welfare e⁄ect of a ￿ne in terms of reducing wasteful
concealing and revealing investments is still positive.
The last case to discuss is what happens if ￿S is much larger than ￿B: In this
case, the increase of ￿B can be larger than the reduction of ￿S; such that the total
￿S + ￿B will increase, as illustrated in Figure 9. In all three cases, ￿ decreases if
D is increased, thereby leading to a higher equilibrium level of e; and a lower b c:
Therefore, all our arguments with respect to the e⁄ects of a conditional trade-secret
protection rule and with respect to damages apply as well in this framework.
The additional e⁄ect captured here is that ￿due to the strategic interaction
in concealing and revealing e⁄orts ￿for ￿S >> ￿B; the socially wasteful incentive
to invest in concealing will increase as a reaction to an increase in D: This runs
counter the standard intuition that a ￿ne for trade-secret violation is bene￿cial
since it can serve as a substitute for costly e⁄orts of the informed party to protect
her information.23 The reason why this intuition is misleading is immediate from
the fact that the best-response functions are not strictly increasing. For instance,
if the seller has invested more than the buyer, ￿S > ￿B; each additional investment
23The idea that trade-secret protection can limit investments in concealing and revealing tech-
nologies, thereby preventing a wasteful "war of attrition" can be found in, e.g., Friedman, Landes,
and Posner (1991), 67-70, Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 485-486 (1974), and
E.I. duPont deNemours & Company, Inc., v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1016 (5th Cir. 1970).
25Figure 9: E⁄ect of increasing D if ￿S ￿ ￿B is large
by the seller increases the marginal productivity of the buyer￿ s investment, due to








00 > 0 for ￿S > ￿B:
Thus, the buyer￿ s best response to an increase in ￿S is to decrease ￿B: The ￿ne works
in the opposite direction by reducing ￿S; which in turn triggers a best response of
increasing ￿B:
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